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WHAT'S GOOD FOR
THE GOOSE IS GOOD
FOR THE GANDER: A
PLEA FOR CONGRESS
TO AMEND THE
NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT TO APPLY
TO THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL
ACTIONS OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
INTRODUCTION
By combining the broad language of
the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA")' with its own *unquestionable
authority .. . to redirect the emphasis of
federal administrative agencies,"
Congress has forced those agencies to
incorporate environmental concerns into
their domestic decision-making process.
But the environment and agency
decisions come into conflict throughout
the world, not just domestically.3 When
parties have suggested that NEPA's
mandate be directed toward all these
agency actions, however, contentious
debate has arisen. There is no consensus
on whether the expansive language of
NEPA can be applied to agencies when
they act outside the borders of the
United States, its territories, and its
possessions.
Unfortunately, there is little in NEPA's
language or legislative history to cast
light on the issue. While courts have
been willing to interpret congressional
intent for other issues on which NEPA is
similarly silent,4  they have been
remarkably recalcitrant in articulating a
coherent body of law regarding the
statute's applicability to extraterritorial
actions of the federal government. Even
in the face of statements by the Council
on Environmental Quality ("CEQ")8 that
NEPA does indeed apply to such actions
of the federal government, the courts
have shied from decisive action.
Recent events have energized the
debate. After a decade and a half of
dodging the crucial issue, last summer's
decision in Environmental Defense Fund
v Massey has provided the first definitive
judicial opinion in the debate: NEPA does
not apply extraterritorially.8
Simultaneously, both House and Senate
members proposed bills that would
expressly amend NEPA to apply to the
government's extraterritorial actions. 7
Two international compacts have also
prompted discussion. Both the European
Community and a subset of the United
Nations have adopted agreements
requiring assessment of the
environmental effects of certain actions.
The compacts are modelled after NEPA,
and both are broadly extraterritorial In
scope.0
Despite present interest, it is doubtful
that additional discussion of the present
evidence will resolve the debate over
extraterritorial application of NEPA.
Evidence within NEPA and its legislative
history supports both sides, and many
others have scoured the terrain and
issued well-reasoned opinions. I will
refrain from adding another view.
Courts, agencies, Congress and others
continue to debate the issue, however,
and the environmental problems caused
by US actions overseas only increase.
With the hope of encouraging action,
I have written this paper to distill the
issues and alleviate concerns about
extraterritorial application. A brief
discussion of NEPA's legislative history,
agency interpretation, and judicial
decisions illuminates its underlying
philosophy and hints that extraterritorial
application would best fulfill its intent. I
will argue along the way that the Massey
court's analysis was misguided and
influenced too heavily by the short-
sighted concerns of the present
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administration. Congress should pass
Senate Bill 1278 and House Bill 1271.
Doing so would resolve the debate, cause
minimal interference with foreign policy,
and could provide long-run economic and
ecological benefis for the United States
and other nations throughout the world.
The amendments would also eliminate
the hypocrisy inherent in the present
system, offering a lower standard of
environmental protection to others that
we do not tolerate for ourselves.
DOES NEPA APPLY TO THE
VARIOUS FEDERAL AGENCIES
WHEN THEY ACT OUTSIDE THE
TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES OF
THE UNITED STATES?
A. Legislative History
NEPA was initiated by a joint House-
Senate colloquium convened to discuss
environmental policy. In its White
Paper," the colloquium recognized that
political boundaries do not define the
global environment or environmental
problems, and declared that "[t is the
policy of the United States that:
Environmental quality and productivity
shall be considered in a worldwide
context."10 While the colloquium
members may have understood that this
policy would be limited to decisions made
within the borders of the United States,
they did not perceive this as a barrier to
the infusion of international relations with
considerations of ecology or the guidance
of domestic activities by the global
character of ecological relationships."
Other legislative references to NEPA's
international implications are sparse. The
House Report argues that "[ilmplicit in
[section 43411 is the understanding that
the international implications of our
current activities will also be considered,
inseparable as they are from the purely
national consequences of our
actions."12 This language, however,
refers only to the effects of projects
governed by NEPA. Nothing makes it
clear that the language covers (or does
not cover) entirely extraterritorial actions
- those which occur and whose effects
are felt beyond the jurisdiction of the
United States.1"
Legislative history indicates that
Congress had a broad definition of
"environment" in mind when it adopted
NEPA. As one drafter asserted, the term
"environment" embraces not only the
nation's life-support system, but also that
of the world as a whole.' Admitting
that the primary concern of Congress
was the nation's own environmental
policy, the drafter insisted that any
rational domestic environmental policy
must enable the United States to act as
a leader in structuring international
efforts to protect the earth's
biosphere.'6
B. The National Environmental Protection
Act
The language of NEPA is no more
illuminating than the legislative history.
This is, in part, because NEPA is a policy
act and relies on broad language to
permit the tailored integration of its
policies into each agency's regime.
NEPA's domestic scope is
considerable. It guarantees public
participation in the decision-making
process of agencies by requiring them to
predict "the environmental impact of the
proposed action" before taking the action
and courting its full effects. 6 While
attempting to "assure for all Americans
safe ... surroundings," it emphasizes the
responsibility each generation has "as
trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations."' 7
The Act's language also includes
several expressions of concern for
worldwide environmental issues. An
environmental impact statement ("EIS") is
required for 'every . . . major Federal
action[] significantly affecting the quality
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of the [human] environment."'8 The EIS
must discuss "any adverse environmental
effects" and must identify "any
irreversible and irretrievable commitment
of resources."1  Acknowledging the
"worldwide and long-range character of
environmental problems," NEPA also
directs federal agencies to cooperate with
foreign nations to achieve NEPA's
objective of "anticipating and preventing
a decline in the quality of [humankind's]
world environment.""0 This language
articulates a universal mandate and
creates no explicit exception for proposed
actions beyond the territorial US.
Admittedly, the statute does not
explicitly require that federal agencies
conduct an EIS concerning their actions
abroad. But the language does indicate
that "NEPA intend[ed] federal agencies to
be []mindful of environmental effects
occurring beyond the borders of the
United States." 21  Furthermore, it
applies to "all agencies of the Federal
Government." 22  This all-inclusive
language may easily be interpreted to
support NEPA's extraterritorial
application. Moreover, Congress realized
that a substantial number of federal
agencies are intimately involved in
activities outside the United States.
Absent an express exemption, it "must
have anticipated that . . . NEPA . . .
would include these agencies and their
actions beyond the United States
borders."
23
Despite the Act's inclusive language
addressing international impacts, all the
federal agencies and any type of
environmental impact, the statute lacks
the requisite explicitness. In an attempt
to resolve the uncertainty, the Council on
Environmental Quality entered the
debate.
C. The Council on Environmental Quality
Between 1976 and 1978, the CEQ
detailed in a series of memoranda draft
regulations governing the extraterritorial
application of NEPA. 4  Finding that
NEPA contained "no express or implied
geographic limitation . . . to the US or
any other area," the Council held that
actions of the federal agencies were
subject to the mandates of NEPA, no
matter where they were to take place."
The draft regulations also Introduced a
"foreign environmental statement" that
modified NEPA's EIS procedures to
account for concerns about applying
NEPA abroad. Under these
modifications, agencies could withhold
sections of the EIS or restrict public
comment to address concerns of delayed
action, diplomatic considerations, or
interference with trade or sovereignty."
With these draft regulations, CEO
sought "to ensure full consideration of
activities that, first, would be unlawful or
strictly regulated in the United States,
second, would threaten natural resources
of global importance, and, third, might
have unanticipated adverse effects in
other foreign countries." 7 These goals
echo the customary norm of international
law that a country must ensure that
activities under its control do not harm
another state's environment.
28
D. Executive Order 12114
In the face of intense opposition from
several federal agencies, CEQ's draft
regulations were withdrawn.29  The
problem of interpreting NEPA remained,
and in 1979 President Carter issued
Executive Order 12114 in an attempt to
reconcile the sides and resolve the issue
once and for all.30 Professing to be the
government's exclusive and complete
determination of the steps to be taken
under NEPA for foreign actions, the Order
was initially heralded as a successful.
compromise. It requires one of three
forms of environmental assessment
("EA") where federal actions will
significantly affect the global commons,
globally important resources, or "innocent
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bystander" nations - those not involved
in the activity. The Order also requires
an EA if the activity would be regulated
under toxic or radioactive substance laws
in the US. 1
While the Order may be seen as an
act of "good citizenship" and "a clear
exercise of responsibility . . . that is
consistent with the best principles of
international conduct,"32 its influence
has been minimal for two reasons 3
First, the order is rife with exceptions and
modifications that were designed, among
other considerations, to enable the
agency to act promptly when necessary,
avoid adversely impacting foreign
relations, and avoid infringing on the
sovereignty of other nations.
Unfortunately, the exceptions created for
activities with potential foreign policy
conflicts are so numerous and broad that
few actions need comply.
Second, the Order was not issued
under the authority of NEPA and, in fact,
it explicitly states that "nothing in [it]
shall be construed to create a cause of
action." 34  The failure of federal
agencies to comply with the Order
cannot, therefore, be challenged. When
combined with the reluctance of recent
administrations to enforce its provisions,
the inability to enforce the Order has
been fatal." Between 1985 and 1988,
compliance was required in only forty-five
instances.-3 Executive Order 12114 did
not end the NEPA controversy. Like so
many other debates over the
interpretation of NEPA, it fell to the
courts to address the issue. They have
done so, but only by answering questions
presented on other, less politically
charged grounds.
E. Litigation Regarding NEPA's
Extraterritorial Application
Scattered cases have discussed the
issue of NEPA's extraterritorial
application both directly and tangentially,
but their results had been inconclusive
until the Massey decision last summer.
Case after case avoided the crucial
question, with individual holdings limited
to the facts and policy considerations
germane to the case at hand.
In People of Enewetak v Laird,37 the
court considered the application of NEPA
to actions of the Department of Defense
("DoD") on one of the Pacific Island Trust
Territories under United States
administration. The DoD was planning to
conduct simulated nuclear explosions on
the island. The issue before the court
was whether NEPA applied to United
States Trust Territories.
The court began its analysis by noting
that federal legislation applied to the
Trust Territories only where Congress
evinced such an intent - and according
to the court, NEPA's language did not,3e
But NEPA's legislative history and prior
case law prompted a closer look. The
Enewetak court found evidence in
NEPA's history that Congress was
particularly concerned about the
international implications of federal
actions.39  It further observed that
NEPA's expansive language reflects "a
concern for all persons subject to federal
action which has a major impact on their
environment. " 40 On the basis of this
evidence and the words of Calvert Cliffs,
which declared that "Itihe sweep of
NEPA is extraordinarily broad, compelling
consideration of any and all types of
environmental impact of federal
action," 41 the court extended the Act to
cover the territories.
After this conclusion, the court
faltered. Arguing that the extension of
NEPA to the Trust Territories did not raise
foreign policy or "balance of world
power" problems, the court found it
unnecessary to decide the merits of the
plaintiff's assertion that "NEPA follows
every federal agency and is applicable
anywhere in the world that such an
agency takes action which will
significantly affect the quality of the
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human environment." 4 2
The next major set of cases involving
NEPA's extraterritorial application
addressed the proposed construction of
the Darien Gap segment of the Pan
American Highway through Panama and
Colombia. The proposal was hotly
contested, as the highway would cut
through a unique ecosystem "almost
wholly undisturbed by any encroachment
of modern civilization."'3
The district court found the EIS
deficient since it (1) failed to consider the
potential domestic impact of a
breakdown in the program to control the
transmission of "foot and mouth" disease
and (2) ignored the possibly fatal impacts
on two indigenous tribes." While the
appeals court reversed, finding the EIS
sufficient, both it and the district court
agreed that the EIS had to consider the
impact on indigenous populations.4 It
was, however, only the potential for
domestic impacts that set the
assessment into motion. Neither court
addressed whether an EIS would be
required if the only impacts were
extraterritorial.
The third case, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v Nuclear
Regulatory Commission ( NRDC v
NRC'),' 6 involved a direct test of
NEPA's extraterritorial application. The
case concerned the construction of a
nuclear power plant in the Philippines
near an American military base that is
situated between four volcanoes in an
earthquake zone. The NRC decided to
license the export of the technology
without first evaluating the health,
safety, and environmental impacts within
the Philippines. The case presented a
situation where the environmental effects
would be felt solely within a foreign
jurisdiction,"4 but the court again
managed to escape the issue of
extraterritorial NEPA application.
Basing its holding on narrow grounds
relating to concerns about the Atomic
Energy Act as amended by the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act ("NNPA"), 4 8 the
court upheld the decision of the NRC. In
the case of nuclear exports, the court
argued, "NEPA's putative extra-territorial
reach [is] curbed," and it found "only that
NEPA does not apply to NRC nuclear
export licensing decisions - and not
necessarily that the EIS requirement Is
inapplicable to some other kind of major
federal action abroad." 41
The judges disagreed on the
underlying reasons for the decision.
Judge Wilkey asserted that requiring an
EIS would interfere with the President's
ability to control export decisions0 and
delay NNPA's attempt to provide a
predictable and expedited nuclear export
process."1 Judge Robinson agreed that
potential interference with the NNPA was
the deciding factor but argued that
considerations of foreign policy actually
favored requiring an EIS for potential
extraterritorial effects.6 " As he pointed
out, "[ilf anything ever should go wrong
... '[tihe voice of many countries would
quickly shift to criticism of the United
States for permitting a dangerous export
with insufficient attention to the risks to
public health and safety and to the
environment.'" 3
NRDC v NRC has not been the only
decision to recognize the special,
protected status given to nuclear issues
when challenged with claims of safety
concerns and environmental impact."'
But because its analysis is restricted to
considerations unique to that context, it
is not a useful guidepost in determining
whether NEPA applies extraterritorially.
Greenpeace USA v Stone'6 came
even closer to definitively deciding
whether NEPA applies to federal actions
abroad. Greenpeace involved a joint
effort between the United States and
German armies to transport chemical
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weapons (100,000 rounds of nerve gas)
owned by the United States from a
storage facility in Germany to Johnston
Atoll, an unincorporated US Territory in
the Pacific Ocean, pursuant to an
agreement President Reagan made with
Chancellor Helmut Kohl to remove and
destroy all obsolete munitions by 1992.
Pursuant to Executive Order 12114, the
DoD conducted three separate EAs
covering all phases of the removal except
the segment from the United States
storage site in Germany to the port of
Nordenham. This procedure was
approved under German law by the
Federal Minister of Transport and upheld
by the German Administrative Court.
Greenpeace challenged the segmentation
of the removal action into three phases
for the EIS and urged the preparation of
a comprehensive EIS."1
As with NRDC v NRC, the foreign
policy considerations presented ultimately
outweighed the importance of NEPA's
requirements. The court opined that
application of the statute to the transfer
already approved by Germany would
indicate a lack of respect for the German
government. It therefore held that a
comprehensive EIS was not required but
limited its holding to the unique facts of
the case. 7  According to the court,
NEPA does not apply to "joint actions
taken on foreign soil based on an
agreement made between the President
and a foreign head of state."6 8 The
court was, however, persuaded that
"Congress ... may have intended under
certain circumstances for NEPA to apply
extraterritorially."69 Although this was
not such an instance, the court
suggested, for example, that "where
there has clearly been a total lack of
environmental assessment by the federal
agency or foreign country involved," an
EIS may be required.'
Finally, last summer the District Court
for the District of Columbia held
definitively that NEPA does not apply to
extraterritorial actions of the federal
government. EDF v Massey involved the
National Science Foundation's ("NSF")
plans to use an incinerator located on its
McMurdo Station in Antarctica to burn
food and selected domestic waste.61
The court's opinion was, however, less
than comprehensive. Addressing the
issue in only six paragraphs, it found no
"plain statement of extraterritorial
statutory effect" and refused to extend
NEPA.62  The court relied almost
exclusively on the recent Supreme Court
decision in EEOC v Arabian American Oil
Co.,' which similarly limited Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act. The Aramco Court
argued that "legislation of Congress,
unless contrary intent appears, is meant
to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.""
The Massey court's summary analysis
is incredibly flawed and shallow. First, it
ignores the settled proposition that NEPA
applies to actions affecting the global
commons. The unique international
political status of Antarctica would
appear to place it within that
category. 6  In addition, the Antarctic
Protocol to which the United States is a
party requires that "Itlhe environmental
impacts of proposed activities . . . be
considered in accordance with
appropriate national procedures" before
the activities are commenced. 66
Second, the concerns about
interfering with foreign policy that arose
in earlier cases did not exist under
Massey. The NSF's station is under the
supervisory jurisdiction of the United
States. Furthermore, foreign relations
have suffered by not applying NEPA in
this case: the incineration of wastes may
endanger a pristine area of the world
protected by several multilateral treaties.
The Protocol has even set 1999 as the
absolute deadline for the phase out of
waste disposal by incineration in
Antarctica and encourages the parties to
meet this goal "as soon as
practicable." 7
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Third, the Massey court's nearly
complete reliance on Aramco is
unjustified. In that case, the Supreme
Court used the presumption against
extraterritorial application expressed in
Foley Bros. as the basis for finding that
without express statutory language, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did
not apply overseas.' The policy behind
Foley Bros. rebuttable presumption,
however, was the desire to avoid the
international discord that might result if
the laws of the United States were
applied in such a way that they clashed
with those of another nation.60 Foley
Bros., like Aramco, concerned labor
practices in another country. Since the
statutes were concerned with regulating
domestic affairs, the Court would not risk
international conflicts by extending its
reach without specific proof of Congress'
intent to do so. 70
According to Foley Bros., however, if
'the application of the domestic laws of
the United States would not significantly
infringe on the sovereignty of a foreign
state, the presumption against
extraterritoriality would not necessarily
apply.71 Massey - and other courts
applying the presumption to NEPA -
entirely overlook this condition.
Finally, the Massey court failed to
notice the crucial distinctions between
the types of regulation involved in the
cases. In Foley Bros. and Aramco, the
actors regulated are private parties. In
NEPA cases, the actors regulated are
branches of the government.
Furthermore, the statutes involved in
Foley Bros. and Aramco forbade specific
conduct in other countries, whereas
NEPA merely governs the decision-
.making process. Since that process
takes place entirely within the United
States, courts should be more willing to
extend NEPA's application than that of
regulations that govern private conduct
that takes place wholly within other
nations.
The legal analysis of NEPA's
extraterritorial application has been
inconclusive at best, and at worst short-
sighted and misguided. Time after time,
courts and respondents alike have
plowed through NEPA's language and
legislative history and come up dry.
Courts lament their inability to extend the
act yet consistently limit their holdings to
the facts before them, emphasizing
sensitive foreign policy implications. The
only definitive opinion, Massey, is
erroneous on the facts. NEPA's scope
remains indeterminate.
Despite the uncertainty, NEPA's
requirement of a pre-decision statement
of impacts and alternatives has
successfully stimulated federal decision-
makers to consider environmental
impacts. 72  But the focus provided by
NEPA is nowhere more important than in
the international realm. Despite the
growing trend in the international arena
to adopt NEPA-type legislation, US
agencies continue to refuse to submit
their overseas actions to NEPA review.
By doing so, the agencies "have damaged
the environment irreversibly" 3 and run
contrary to the "concept of the collective
responsibility of nations for the quality
and protection of the earth as a whole"
that was expressed at the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm in 1972.7 The flexibility of
NEPA permits, ahd its underlying
philosophy calls for, international
application.
Agencies and other defendants
involved in the extraterritorial debate are
quick to point out that if Congress was
concerned that NEPA was not being
interpreted properly by the courts, it
could amend the statute, as it did Title
VII in the wake of the Aramco
decision.75  Congress is presently
considering two bills that will do just
that. The remainder of this paper will
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discuss the varied policy reasons
supporting such an amendment, rebut the
legal arguments voiced in opposition, and
conclude that Congress should adopt the
amendments as soon as possible.
CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS
TO EXTEND NEPA'S REACH
Over the last few years, Congress has
considered several bills designed to
clarify and extend the scope of NEPA's
application. All of them would amend
NEPA to ensure its international
application.
Senate Bill 1089, introduced in 1989,
clarified that "NEPA applies to all federal
actions, not just those in the United
States. It provides for the full
consideration of environmental impacts
on areas outside US jurisdiction [and]
includes cumulative impacts of proposed
Federal actions on global climate change,
depletion of the ozone layer, and
transboundary pollution."78 Proponents
of the bill acknowledged the controversial
nature of the amendments, but asserted
that the present extraterritorial exemption
undercut NEPA's thrust.77  The
sponsors also contended that if President
Bush was serious about his purported
desire for the United States to become a
leader in addressing international
environmental challenges, the
administration's position against NEPA's
extraterritorial application would have to
change.78
In the same year, the House
considered House Bill 1113, which would
have added a new section to NEPA to
"ensure the formal assessment, in a
manner [consistent with NEPAL of the
significant effects of [each agency's]
major actions, including extraterritorial
actions, on the environment outside the
jurisdiction of the United States and its
trusts and possessions."7 ' Rep. Studds
(D-MA), who introduced the legislation,
pointed to the hypocrisy of the United
States' assumption of a leadership role in
confronting international environmental
problems: the United States generates
the most greenhouse gasses, uses the
most CFCs, and consumes the most
fossil fuels, yet "not one Federal action
has been systematically reviewed for its
impact on the international environment
- as required by NEPA - in this
decade.""0
Both S 1089 and HR 1113 were
tabled for discussion in 1989. Their
slightly revised successors, S 1278 and
HR 1271, are presently before Congress.
Either bill would ensure agency
consideration of the impacts of federal
actions on the global commons and on
other nations. The first bill, HR 1271,
was introduced in March of 1991 by
Representative Studds. It would
encourage US leadership in the
international environmental realm. One
means to that end is the amendment of
Section 102(2)(F) to require agencies to
.work vigorously" to forge multilateral
agreements.81
Regarding agency actions on the
environment outside the jurisdiction of
the United States, the bill requires the
CEQ to
(a) ... issue regulations under which
each Federal agency shall -
(1) ensure the consideration,
pursuant to section 102 of
[NEPA], of the effects of its
actions, including extraterritorial
actions, on the environment of the
global commons outside the
jurisdiction of any nation; and
(2) ensure the formal assessment,
consistent with the national
security and foreign policy of the
United States and in a manner
that furthers the objectives of
[NEPA], of the effects of its
action, including extraterritorial
actions, on the environment
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within the jurisdiction of other
nations.
(b) The regulations issued by the
[CEQ] ... shall include guidance
for federal agencies for assess-
ing the effects (including
cumulative effects) of proposed
action, on -
(1) global climate change; (2)
depletion of the ozone layer; (3)
the loss of biological diversity;
(4) transboundary pollution; and
(5) other matters of international
environmental concern.8"
True to NEPA's style, this section
accords the agencies broad flexibility in
considering each action by seeking to
strike a balance with other factors of
national importance. It offers federal
agencies guidance as to the types of
impacts that are of significant import in
the international setting. At the same
time, however, agencies have the
discretion, based on their respective
areas of expertise, to escape from
NEPA's requirements if national security
interests or foreign policy considerations
so demand. But the "shall" language of
the section also puts some teeth into the
extraterritorial requirements for which it
offers guidance.
The Senate's proposed NEPA
amendments were introduced on June
11, 1991 as S 1278. Although
substantially similar to the House
amendments, the Senate bill more
explicitly recognizes certain conflicts that
may preclude NEPA application. For
example, the bill would amend Section
102(2)(C) to read:
[each agency shall] include in every
recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other
major federal actions, including
extraterritorial actions (other than
those taken to protect the national
security of the United States, votes In
international conferences and
organizations, actions taken in the
course of an armed conflict, strategic
intelligence actions, armament
transfers, or judicial or administrative
civil or criminal enforcement actions),
significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment, a detailed
statement .... 83
If the listed exemptions are not sufficient,
the bill also permits the President to
"find, on a case-by-case basis, that it is
in the paramount interest of the United
States to exempt a major Federal action"
from the EIS requirements of a revised
Section 102(2)(C). 4 The exemption is
a flexible one: the amendments set no
boundaries and offer no guidance as to
the type of actions that may qualify.
By clarifying Congress' Intent to
extend NEPA's application, these two
bills answer criticisms voiced by all sides
of the debate. They are also consistent
with the spirit of NEPA as a policy-
oriented statute, imposing no formal
mechanism of choice on an agency and
merely clarifying that, if the government
acts outside of the US, it must consider
the environmental impacts of the
proposed action. As law, the bills would
merely further NEPA's main objective: in
agency decision-making, the environment
should weigh equally along with other
legitimate concerns.
The bills are also responsive to
concerns about extending NEPA to
extraterritorial actions, including fears of
interference with foreign policy and
infringement upon the sovereignty of
other nations. The following discussion
addresses some of the more compelling
factors fueling the debate and illustrates
that the most commonly expressed fears
about extending NEPA's application are
ill-founded.
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POLITICAL AND LEGAL
ARGUMENTS AGAINST
EXTENDING NEPA: POINT &
COUNTERPOINT
A. Foreign Policy
The design of foreign policy is perhaps
the most important activity the federal
government undertakes with an effect on
the global environment. ' Despite the
significant impact or the environment,
many fear that imposing NEPA on
projects outside the United States will
present conflicts with foreign policy
objectives. Additional bureaucratic
requirements, it is argued, will damage
relations, delay implementation of
international development projects,
violate principles of international comity
and fairness, and place too much stress
on foreign relations 8 But this fear of
bureaucratic stagnation glosses over
several critical considerations. It is,
ultimately, reactionary and baseless.
First, according to the Constitution,
Congress has the power "to provide for
the common defense and the general
welfare." 87 A healthy environment is
necessary for national and global
security, and our welfare is utterly
dependent upon it. In the interest of
safeguarding against unknown and
potentially severe adverse effects,
applying NEPA to extraterritorial actions
of the federal government is consistent
with the constitutional powers of
Congress. Pursuant to that
Constitutional grant, Congress' role in
foreign affairs is "a legislative component
of powers of the United States that
inhere in its sovereignty and
nationhood.""9
Second, implicit in the view that NEPA
would "interfere" with foreign affairs is
the assumption "that NEPA litigation is
frivolous or of no public benefit and that
statutory amendments cannot contain
adequate exemptions to protect the
United States' interest abroad."8 This
assumption slights NEPA's successes in
the domestic sphere as well as its
profound international influence: its ethic
and even its very language have been
adopted worldwide. Sanctioning NEPA's
philosophy, the United Nations and
various international bodies have written
'a global environmental ethic . . . into
treaties, resolutions, and administrative
practice" worldwide. 0  "Mhe many
recent developments in domestic and
international environmental protection
have provided a new background against
which to measure . . . foreign policy
concerns."*9  Within this new
framework, NEPA can only assure
consistency. It is hypocritical for the US
to insist on an EIS for multinational bank
development projects while
simultaneously refusing to require one for
our own agencies' actions overseas. To
paraphrase an old adage, we must
practice what we preach if we want
others to listen and follow.
Third, this narrow perspective ignores
the specific accommodations of foreign
policy and national defense made in the
existing statute and proposed legislation.
Section 102 of NEPA requires that
agencies comply only "to the fullest
extent possible."9 " This flexibility is
designed to avoid conflicts between
NEPA's implementation and actions
deemed essential to national or foreign
policy. The proposed amendments add
even more flexibility by providing certain
explicit exemptions from EIS
requirements and establishing (in S 1278)
a Presidential waiver that may be used on
a case-by-case basis. These provisions
recognize the practical difficulties
experienced while working within the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. Where
lack of cooperation of a foreign nation or
other considerations of foreign policy
make exact compliance impossible, NEPA
relieves agencies of that burden and
"only mandates gathering and evaluating
data that can reasonably be
collected." 3 In this way, NEPA and its
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amendments allow the agencies to
protect essential relationships with other
nations without compromising our
national policy on the environment.
Fourth, the purported fear of foreign
policy conflict merely illustrates the
reality of the double role that is played by
all nation states. Each country struggles
to apply international legal principles
while giving effect to the national
interests expressed in its laws and
regulations. 9' The United States has
successfully managed this dual role in
other legal areas, finding it necessary and
proper to legislate extraterritorially to
address antitrust, smuggling, and
trademark issues. These laws, designed
to protect discrete classes of individuals
and the legal values they uphold, can
hardly be considered more significant to
the national interest than those
protecting the environment, which
directly affect the entire global
population, present and future. To the
extent that extraterritorial application of
NEPA does conflict with the execution of
foreign policy, it merely indicates the
presence of the inherent conflict facing
national actors in an international realm.
Just as for other areas of interest, linking
international and domestic law through
the successful execution of this double
role is crucial for environmental
protection.
Finally, the foreign policy of the
United States would be enhanced, not
hampered, by the extraterritorial
application of NEPA. Thus, at the
request of nations with equal stakes in
Antarctica, the NSF is spending hundreds
of thousands of dollars to clean up sites
it polluted there. "[T]he very failure of
federal agencies to avoid environmental
damage by complying with [NEPAl has
resulted in ill will abroad."9  The same
failure also leads to lawsuits: the CEQ
recently observed that the most frequent
cause of action for cases filed under
NEPA is for failure to prepare an EIS.99
By ensuring that agencies engage in
impact assessment, the NEPA
amendments would avoid significant
conflicts and litigation, thereby reducing
the potential for delay. Requiring
environmental review of all agency
actions will present the sort of leadership
image expected of the world's most
affluent and powerful nation: the United
States is as concerned about the
environment and welfare of the world's
many communities as it is about Its own.
B. Jurisdiction
But can this leadership image be
exported through the use of NEPA?
Since "extraterritoriality is essentially a
jurisdictional concept concerning the
authority of a nation" to adjudicate
rights, dstablish norms, and exercise
power,9 7 opponents of extension argue
that doing so would not be a legitimate
exercise of the United States' jurisdiction.
But three recognized bases for
asserting jurisdiction would permit
NEPA's extraterritorial application."6
The first is the "objective territorial"
principle. Under this doctrine, a nation
has jurisdiction over actions it conducts
extraterritorially if those actions have
domestic effects. Since the Earth's
environment is intimately interconnected,
any action taken by the United States
government, either at home, within its
territories, or abroad, is certain to have
some sort of domestic repercussion, such
as global warming's effects on crop
production, or depleting an important
resource found only in another country.
Since it is virtually impossible to
safeguard the environment of the US
without protecting that of other nations,
this argument is a legitimate basis for the
jurisdiction to apply NEPA to foreign
actions of the federal government.90
The second possible basis for
asserting NEPA's extraterritorial
application is the "nationality" principle.
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Under this principle, a country may assert
prescriptive jurisdiction when a proposed
action involves the activities of its
nationals, either within or outside its
territory.100 An agency of the United
States, therefore, is subject to US law in
the performance of official duties, no
matter where the performance takes
place.1° ' Accordingly, Congress may
legitimately require that agency officials
comply with NEPA when acting abroad in
their official capacity.
Finally, the "universality" principle
provides that a state may punish offenses
of universal concern, such as piracy and
terrorism.102 As we have come to
realize, environmental degradation is
perhaps more of a threat to the global
commons than acts of terrorism, if only
because of the harm to future
generations. On the basis of the concern
expressed in recent flurries of
international agreements designed to
protect the environment, it is certainly
within the jurisdiction of the US Congress
to do its part to ensure that our own
actors are not contributing to the piracy
of the planet's health.
C. Sovereignty
The most fundamental substantive
objection to NEPA's extraterritorial
application is the impact it would have on
the sovereignty of other nations. Would
an environmental "double-checking" by
the United States thrust us into the
internal development decisions of foreign
states, intruding into their internal affairs
and improperly substituting our standards
for their own? As one scholar noted, a
"fundamental stumbling block in
international law . . . has been the
jealously-held sovereignties of 159
independent nation states, states that
often were created - and behave -
without regard to the common setting in
which they exist."' 1 -
Each nation has the right to govern
itself without interference from other
nations, and as part of that right, to
develop its natural resources as it sees
fit.'' At the same time, however,
"[sitates have . . . the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction."' 0' Sovereignty,
therefore, is the basis not only for a
state's freedom of action, but also the
state's responsibility for its actions that
injure others.106
With the growing attention to
environmental problems, more and more
nations are agreeing to compromise their
sovereignty somewhat in order to protect
various resources "that might otherwise
be lost to all."' 07  As more nations
adopt their own environmental
assessment laws, the apprehension about
interfering with another's sovereignty
loses force. If a country requires the
preparation of some sort of
environmental assessment anyway, it
should not consider the NEPA provisions
to be an infringement on its
sovereignty.1o
Many fear that requiring an agency of
the United States to prepare an EIS in
another country would demand the
intimate cooperation of that country and
would ultimately subject its development
program "to the critical and inherently
political scrutiny of American
comment." 1' This concern is
overblown. Preparing an EIS involves no
more intrusion and scrutiny than the
widely accepted, practice of preparing a
feasibility study for foreign projects." 0
Consider as well the level of US
intervention in other areas of international
concern, such as human and civil rights,
world financial markets, and the oil
supply. Ultimately, the decision whether
to intervene is one of policy, not
practicality. Past administrations and
Congress simply has not yet put
environmental issues on parity with other
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issues of international scope and
importance.
Finally, NEPA primarily governs the
procedural conduct of federal agencies,
not the substance of individual actions.
While agency choices lead to actions and
impacts outside the United States, the
decisions to assist projects, issue
permits, grant loans, and insure
investments are made at home. "The
United States is not debarred from
governing the conduct of its own citizens
.. in foreign countries when the rights
of other nations or their nationals are not
infringed."" 1  Since NEPA's scope
extends only to US actors, and primarily
to US decisions, its extraterritorial
application would not hinder the actions
of foreign nations or their citizens in
violation of international law. If another
nation chooses to proceed with a project
rejected for unacceptable risks by a US
agency, it may do so, looking elsewhere
for the desired assistance. Such a policy
may lead to difficult decisions, but it does
no more than require agencies to afford
the people of other nations the same
level of respect that they do our own
citizens. 112
Extending NEPA would have little
adverse effect upon our own foreign
policy or the sovereignty of other nations.
On the contrary, extraterritorial
application would bring the US into line
with accepted principles of international
law, emphasize our role as leaders in the
environmental arena, and guarantee
consistency in our policies toward
concerns overseas. These are, however,
only a few of the host of issues that
favor amending NEPA.
POLICY ARGUMENTS IN
SUPPORT OF NEPA'S
EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION
A. Ecological Considerations
We operate in a political context
comprised of scores of nations, each
acting out of self-interest. Under the
most extreme view of sovereignty,
nations may develop their own natural
resources with impunity as they see fit,
whether their action is to squander,
hoard, trade or ration. While most
nations exhibit a more mild form of
sovereignty, they retain a fierce sense of
independence and isolation. In this
milieu, laws regarding the environment
exhibit vast differences, and multilateral
agreements are difficult, if not
impossible, to arrange.
But ecological effects do not
recognize the isolation of human-imposed
boundaries. The results of an individual
government's regulations and decisions
transcend its political boundaries to
affect the global environment.
With this interconnectedness comes
global responsibility. As one of the
Earth's most prosperous and powerful
countries, it is imperative that the United
States take the lead and demonstrate its
commitment to changing the course of
current trends toward ozone depletion,
global warming, species extinction, and
other phenomena that are largely the
result of our patterns of industrialization
and consumption. NEPA's "look before
you leap" philosophy and its integration
of scientific information and methodology
into policy development have made its
implementation an important step toward
this leadership. While ecological
information is necessarily uncertain,
NEPA provides a vehicle by which that
uncertainty can be converted into action.
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Unfortunately, the present US
administration has fallen prey to
environmental isolationism and has
responded to uncertainty with delay,
vowing to make research a priority but
forestalling decisive action.11 Other
nations, however, have recognized the
-necessity of working together to prevent
international environmental damage and
have chosen to respond while
studying.' 14 The United States must
as well.
By applying NEPA to international
actions, the United States can
simultaneously affirm the unity of
environmental problems and develop
solutions to solve those problems.
Environmental Impact Assessment
("EIA") review of extraterritorial actions
may either prompt beneficial actions or
minimize the adverse effect of projects
planned for other reasons. In any event,
NEPA's extension would make US
activities overseas a model for
ecologically sensitive planning, and would
do so while acting, rather than waiting,
to preserve the environment.
B. Economic Considerations
Although a greater understanding of
the relationship between economic
development and environmental concerns
is needed, experience has shown that
"good economic policies and good
environmental policies are mutually
reinforcing.""I6 It is usually far cheaper
and more effective in the long run to
prevent environmental damage than to
clean it up or otherwise address its
consequences." 6 This is true on both
national and individual levels. Even the
global economy, ultimately dependent on
the consumption of resources, relies on
those smaller-scale activities that are so
intimately affected by the quality of their
environment.
Unfortunately, on a national level,
shorter-term needs often outweigh
longer-term perspectives. Foreign
exchange necessary for development
depends on resource exploitation. To the
extent that the sale or lease of resources
and land to industrialized nations will be
affected by the EIS process, developing
nations reject it, believing that it will
impede their economic progress." 7
But the short-term view leads too quickly
to the over-exploitation of fragile
ecosystems that contain the natural
resource base many developing countries
need for future growth. Poorly
considered development can thereby
imperil the biological foundations of
national, and ultimately global,
economies." 6 Requiring an EIS before
a project may be implemented, therefore,
merely generates the information and
analysis necessary to make the most
well-informed decision. An EIS can take
into consideration ecological and social
factors and help design projects to suit
local environments."" The EIS analysis
may avert potentially devastating effects
associated with a project, thereby
protecting development, the environment,
and the economy of the country.
Feasibility studies (regularly conducted in
the context of international trade) engage
in essentially the same analysis from an
economic point of view, yet rarely evoke
the objections and accusations that
plague proposed EIS analysis under
NEPA.
On a smaller scale, American
businesses and government officials
make arguments against the extension of
NEPA that are surprisingly similar to
those made by developing countries. The
vociferous American business community
fears that its ability to compete in foreign
markets "will be dramatically curtailed by
rendering governmentally sponsored or
approved exports subject to NEPA,"120
that the imposition of domestic
environmental regulations burdens
international trade, and that lawsuits will
cause serious delays and frighten away
potential partners.'2' Such arguments
are potent in a time of economic
uncertainty,122 and as a result the
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broad principles embodied in NEPA often
succumb to the pressures of short-term
economic interests and political
momentum.
But some companies that feared
similar horrors with the domestic
imposition of NEPA have found
differently. They testify that the use of
more efficient technologies and pollution
control devices has actually boosted their
profits and created new markets while
relieving 'some of the threats of future
litigation. 2 ' Even if the fears are valid,
similar complaints arguing against NEPA
application in the domestic context have
been rejected in the courts, 12 ' which
recognize that NEPA represents a
reprioritization of national goals and
requires some sacrifice for the greater
good of environmental protection.
Extraterritorial extension would simply
further this goal.
In a perfect world, competitive
advantage based on differing
environmental laws could be eliminated
by orchestrating them on an international
scale.12 1 Under such a regime, no one
country would benefit from exploiting its
own, or another's, environment. By
strengthening our own environmental
assessment rules, the US can encourage
the trend toward such regulation. In the
meantime, businesses may well find that
ecological responsibility costs money.
That tradeoff, however, is little different
than the costs of workers' compensation,
or unemployment insurance. Again, it is
a question of priorities. Considering the
potential harms stemming from
inattention or active ignorance, some
increased cost to business is a small price
to pay for the added protection of the
global environment.
C. Equitable Considerations
Developing countries have traditionally
been suspicious of attempts by the
industrialized nations to encourage
environmental protection regimes. They
are often worried that the movement
"conceal[s] a neo-imperialist scheme to
retard their economic growth" and to
keep them in a perpetual state of
dependency, casting them as both the
subservient suppliers of underpriced raw
materials and the consumers of the
industrialized nations' output. 120
Opponents of this so-called
environmental imperialism are quick to
point out statistics that expose ar)
element of hypocrisy in the alarmist
reports of the industrialized world.
Countless reports show that "the
principal causes for the deterioration of
the environment on a world-wide scale
are the patterns of industrialization and
consumption as well as waste in the
developed countries. "12 7 When "each
individual in the industrialized nations
draws, on the average, thirty times more
heavily on the limited resources of the
earth than [a] fellow [being] in the
developing countries[, ... simple facts
inevitably raise the question of equality,
of more equal distribution between
countries and within countries."
120
Several Latin American countries have
spoken out against these inequalities of
consumption and responsibility. They
"urge the industrialized countries to
assume full responsibility commensurate
with their financial and technological
resources to reverse the process of
defacement of the environment."
1 20
The industrialized nations, being richer as
well as greater consumers, have the
resources and the room for change.130
In contrast to the United States, many
European countries have already taken
measures to substantially reduce their
emissions.' The US, the highest per
capita consumer of food and energy In
the world, should follow their lead and
demonstrate its willingness to pay the
price for the toll it takes on the
international environment.
At the same time, compliance with
WHAT'S GOOD FOR THE GOOSE IS GOOD FOR THE GANDER 17
NEPA when acting abroad would lend
much integrity to US actions and
decisions and would strengthen its
"political and moral force by eliminating
the double standard that honesty is
warranted at home, but not abroad." 3 '
Where the absence of an EIS permits the
export of environmentally unsound
practices which have been prohibited or
made subject to strict control
domestically, the hypocrisy of the United
States stands as a significant barrier in
encouraging international environmental
protection. Applying NEPA to those
actions is an important step in the right
direction.
D. Poverty and Environmental
Degradation: Mutually Reinforcing
Even if the industrialized nations took
on their share of responsibility for
protecting the international environment,
the problem would not be solved. The
foremost environmental problem in the
world is the poverty of the Third World,
and many developing countries see
industrial growth as the only route by
which to escape it." As a result,
many of these countries are all too eager
to accept the polluting industries and
unwanted toxic and hazardous wastes of
the industrialized world in exchange for
debt relief, agricultural assistance, and a
few jobs. Yet the exorbitant debt many
of them acquired in the aftermath of "de-
colonialization" continues to motivate
their transformation into net exporters of
capital to the creditor countries at the
cost of intolerable social, economic, and
environmental sacrifices.' The Latin
American and Caribbean Summit
Declaration asserted that the
underdevelopment and environmental
deterioration experienced in the Third
World are "factors in a vicious circle that
condemns millions of people to a quality
of life beneath the norms of human
dignity." 3 It is only by disrupting this
cycle that the steady motion toward
environmental ruin can be averted. The
United States can play a significant role
in that disruption.
Because of its reliance on overseas
resources, the magnitude of its
international trade, and the numerous
activities of its agencies abroad, the
United States plays the principal role in
determining how the world's resources
are allocated and, ultimately, exhausted.
With this preeminent position and the
repercussions of its activities comes a
concomitant moral and political
responsibility "to ask questions . . .
before it asks the world to blindly leap off
environmental cliffs.""'6 Although no
one country can maintain the health of
the biosphere unilaterally, the influence of
the United States is so pervasive and
powerful "that we cannot ignore our
pivotal role in protecting and improving
world environmental health."13 '
Our position of power and affluence is
not inevitable. Along with the "new
world order" will likely come a reordering
of resource allocations and priorities. If
we are to protect our national interests,
it is imperative that we "move toward an
entirely new, ecologically oriented foreign
policy that places its greatest emphasis
on the global balances among population,
resources and environmental
quality." 138 One important step will be
for the US to uphold Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Convention, which states, in
part, that
states have . . . the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other
states or of areas beyond the limits of
a national jurisdiction. 39
The House and Senate bills would take
on that responsibility. Investigating the
impacts of a proposed activity abroad will
identify possible adverse effects, just as
the EIS process does at home. In
conjunction with Principle 21, extending
NEPA to extraterritorial actions will
guarantee that the United States does
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not impose deleterious effects on other,
bystander nations.
CONCLUSION
NEPA's success is indisputable.
Landmark legislation at the time of its
introduction, it is no longer unique in its
approach to protecting the environment.
It is by many estimates the most widely
heralded and followed US law in the
world: approximately eighty-seven
nations and most of the international and
multinational development banks have
followed the United States' lead and
adopted EIA-type laws of their own. All
of these laws were modelled after
NEPA.'" In addition, there have been
a number of international organizations
created to protect and preserve the
environment. 14 ' Their agreements and
conventions exhibit a remarkable unity of
mind and common philosophy toward
environmental protection. Unfortunately,
many of these laws and organizations are
largely ineffective. To assist them in
their development, the US must continue
to grow in its environmental commitment
to the international realm.
All the arguments commonly raised
against extending NEPA's application to
cover extraterritorial actions actually
favor the broader scope. Moreover,
environmental protection is integral to a
host of other economic and ethical issues
that concern us daily. Just as we
attempt to lead in those areas, our
responsibilities as one of the most
powerful and prosperous nations in the
world militate a new stewardship on the
part of our government. Congress should
act this session to amend NEPA and
show the rest of the world that they, too,
have a right to a healthy and safe
environment.
- Michelle B. Nowlin
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